Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme by Hui, CK et al.
Title Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
Author(s) He, Y; Chim, TW; Hui, CK; Yiu, SM
Citation
The 5th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies,
Mobility and Security (NTMS’12), Istanbul, Turkey, 7-10 May
2012. In Proceedings of the International Conference on New
Technologies, Mobility and Security, 2012, p. article no. 6208714
Issued Date 2012
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192710
Rights Proceedings of the International Conference on NewTechnologies, Mobility and Security. Copyright © I E E E.
Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
Yi-Jun He, Tat Wing Chim, Lucas Chi Kwong Hui, Siu-Ming Yiu
Department of Computer Science,
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
{yjhe, twchim, hui, smyiu}@cs.hku.hk
Abstract—A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a
proxy to re-encrypt a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) to a
ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) without seeing the underlying
plaintext. However, existing PRE schemes generally suffer from
at least one of the followings. Some schemes fail to provide the
non-transferable property in which the proxy and the delegatee
can collude to further delegate the decryption right to anyone.
This is the main open problem left for PRE schemes. Other
schemes assume the existence of a fully trusted private key
generator (PKG) to generate the re-encryption key to be used
by the proxy for re-encrypting a given ciphertext for a target
delegatee. But this poses two problems in PRE schemes if the
PKG is malicious: the PKG in their schemes may decrypt
both original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts (referred
as the key escrow problem); and the PKG can generate re-
encryption key for arbitrary delegatees without permission
from the delegator (we refer to it as the PKG despotism
problem).
In this paper, we propose the first non-transferable proxy
re-encryption scheme which successfully achieves the non-
transferable property. We show that the new scheme solved
the PKG despotism problem and key escrow problem as well.
Keywords-proxy re-encryption; PKG despotism; non-
transferable property
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Proxy Re-encryption
The proxy re-encryption [2] allows a third-party (the
proxy) to re-encrypt a ciphertext which has been encrypted
for one party without seeing the underlying plaintext so
that it can be decrypted by another. For example: Alice
keeps some sensitive files in encrypted form in the file
server; Bob fetches encrypted files from file server, and then
transmits them to proxy; Alice sends a re-encryption key to
the proxy which re-encrypts the encrypted files and sends
Bob the re-encrypted ciphertext which can be decrypted by
Bob with his own private key. This scheme aroused much
interest in the encryption community [1], [2], [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] since it could be exploited
in a number of applications for achieving better information
security and privacy, such as: email forwarding, encrypted
files distribution, law-enforcement monitoring, etc..
B. Review of the Transferable Problem
A proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be non-
transferable [1] if the proxy and a set of colluding delegatees
cannot re-delegate decryption rights to other parties. On
one hand, this is a very desirable property. For example,
user A saves some encrypted private confidential files on
the file server. If A delegates B the decryption right for
accessing those files, A may need some guarantee that his
files “go no further”. It requires that the delegatee B plus
the proxy cannot re-delegate decryption right to others. On
the other hand, researchers [1], [7] are even not sure that
transferability can be preventable since the delegatee B can
always decrypt and forward the plaintext to another party.
However, this approach requires that the delegatee remains
an active, online participant. What we want to prevent
is the delegatee (plus the proxy) providing other parties
with a secret value that can be used offline to decrypt A’s
ciphertexts. Again, the delegatee can always send its secret
key to another party. But in doing so, the delegatee puts itself
in a risky situation. Therefore, achieving a non-transferable
PRE scheme, in the sense that the only way for delegatee to
transfer decryption capabilities to another party is to expose
his own secret key, seems to be the main open problem left
for PRE.
C. Limitations of Existing Solutions
Libert and Vergnaud [7] indicated that it is quite difficult
to prevent the proxy and delegatees from colluding to do
re-delegation and that discouraging collusion rather than
preventing illegitimate re-delegation is an easier approach.
Thus, they try to trace the malicious proxy after its collusion
with one or more delegatees. No doubt that it works to deter
collusion from happening. However, it is more desirable to
have a better way to prevent collusion, not just discourage
collusion. Some identity-based PRE schemes [8], [10], [11],
[12], [13], [14] assume the existence of a fully trusted
private key generator (PKG) which helps to generate the re-
encryption key to be used by the proxy for re-encrypting
a given ciphertext for a target delegatee. Since the re-
encryption key is generated using the master key of the
PKG, the proxy and the delegatee(s) cannot further delegate
the decryption right to others without the help of the PKG.
However, this creates two problems in PRE schemes. First,
there is another key escrow problem, in which the PKG
in their schemes may be able to decrypt both original and
re-encrypted ciphertexts; And the PKG despotism problem,
in which the PKG itself has the power of generating a
re-encryption key for transferring decryption right to ar-
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bitrary delegatees. Thus those PKG-based PRE schemes
just transformed the “delegatee-proxy-collusion transferable
problem” to a “PKG alone transferable problem”. So it is
fair to say that they did not solve the transferable problem.
Recently, Hayashi et al. [4] tried to achieve the non-
transferability by reducing the non-transferable property to
a relaxed notion “the unforgeability of re-encryption keys
against collusion attack (UFReKey-CA)”, which meas that
proxies and delegatees cannot collude to generate a re-
encryption key for some user, but as pointed out in their
paper, they have not succeeded in constructing a scheme that
meets the non-transferability, because the malicious user can
extract the plaintext even without the re-encryption key.
D. Our Contributions
• The proposed scheme has the non-transferable property.
The re-encryption key is generated by a key generating
centre (PKG); Delegator participants actively to help
generating partial decryption key for delegatee using
part of his private key. Thus delegatee and proxy cannot
collude to re-delegate decryption rights since they do
not have knowledge of PKG’s master secret or the
delegator’s private key.
• Without the participation of the delegator, PKG is
unable to generate any useful re-encryption key for
delegating decryption right, thus completely resolves
the PKG despotism problem.
• PKG cannot decrypt the original ciphertext and re-
encrypted ciphertexts as well, thus solving the key
escrow problem.
II. OUR NON-TRANSFERABLE PRE SCHEME
We construct the Non-Transferable PRE scheme based on
the basic IBE system proposed in [3]. The main ideas of
the scheme are as follow: Before delegation, delegator will
send delegatee’s identity to PKG. PKG is responsible for
generating the re-encryption key, and sending this key and
some other information to delegator. Delegator checks the
correctness of the re-encryption key, and generates a partial
decryption key making use of the information received from
PKG. Then, delegator sends the re-encryption key to the
proxy, and the partial decryption key to delegatee. The proxy
re-encrypts the original ciphertext from delegator, and sends
the re-encrypted ciphertext to delegatee. The delegatee can
decrypt the ciphertext using his private key and the partial
decryption key received from delegator.
In the following sections, we let Alice (A) be the delegator,
and Bob (B) be the delegatee.
Setup:
Let G and GT be groups of order p such that p is a
k-bit prime, and let e : G × G → GT be the bilinear
map. HI :{0, 1}∗ → Zp, H:{0, 1}∗ → Zp, H ′:GT → Zp
are secure hash functions. The PKG selects four random
generators h1, h2, h3, g ∈ G and randomly chooses α ∈ Zp.
It sets g1 = gα. Define the message space M ∈ GT . The
public parameters mpk and master secret key msk are given
by mpk = (g, g1, h1, h2, h3,HI ,H,H ′,M), msk = (α).
Key Generation:
This is a protocol through which a user U with an identity
ID can securely get his partial private key from PKG.
On input the public key/master secret key pair (mpk,
msk) and an identity IDA ∈ {0, 1}k of entity A, the
PKG computes idA = HI(IDA). If idA = α , it aborts.
Otherwise, the protocol proceeds as follow:
• Set-Secret-Value. Entity A selects rA ∈ Zp at random.
rA is A’s secret value.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract.
1) A sends R = h1rA to PKG, and gives PKG the
following zero-knowledge proof of knowledge:
PK{rA : R = h1rA}
2) PKG randomly selects r′A, rA,2, rA,3 ∈ Zp and
computes
h′A=(Rg
−r′A)1/(α−idA),
hA,2=(h2g−rA,2)1/(α−idA),
hA,3=(h3g−rA,3)1/(α−idA)
and sends A’s partial private key (r′A, h′A, rA,2,
hA,2, rA,3, hA,3) to A.
• Set-Private-Key. A computes
rA,1 = r′A/rA, hA,1 = (h
′
A)
1/rA = (h1g−rA,1)1/(α−idA)
Then, A’s private key can be denoted as
uskA = (rA, rA,1, hA,1, rA,2, hA,2, rA,3, hA,3)
Similarly, the delegatee B’s private key is denoted as
uskB = (rB , rB,1, hB,1, rB,2, hB,2, rB,3, hB,3)
• Set-Public-Key. A publishes her public key upkA =
(pA,1, pA,2), where pA,1 = g1rA , and pA,2 = grAidA .
Anyone can verify the validity of upkA by checking if
the equality e(gidA , pA,1)=e(g1, pA,2) holds.
Private Key Correctness Check:
On input (mpk, uskID) and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}k, A
computes idA = HI (IDA) and checks whether
e(hA,i, g1/gidA) = e(hig−rA,i ,g)
for i=1,2,3. If correct, output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
Encryption:
To encrypt a message m ∈ GT using public key, sender
checks that whether the equality e(gidA , pA,1)=e(g1, pA,2)
holds. If not, output ⊥ and abort encryption. Otherwise,
sender generates a unique randomly-selected secret parame-
ter s ∈ Zp, and computes idA = HI (IDA). Finally, sender
outputs the ciphertext C where:
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6) =(pA,1spA,2−s, e(g, g)s, m ·
e(g, h1)
−s
, e(g, g)H
′(m)
, gsβ+H
′(m)
, e(g, h2)se(g, h3)sβ).
We set β = H(C1, C2, C3, C4).
Decryption(delegator):
To decrypt a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6)
using secret key uskA, delegator A computes β =
H(C1, C2, C3, C4) and tests whether e(C5, g) = Cβ2 C4 and
C6 = e(C1, hA,2hA,3β)1/rA ·C2rA,2+rA,3β . If it is not equal,
outputs ⊥. Else A computes m = C3 · e (C1, hA,1)1/rA ·
C2
rA,1
. If e(g, g)H′(m) = C4 holds, return m; otherwise
return ⊥.
The following Re-Encryption process is done through an
interactive protocol among delegator A, delegatee B, PKG
and Proxy.
Re-Encryption Key Generation:
1) In our PRE scheme, B is only allowed to decrypt
messages intended for A during some specific time
period i. To achieve this property, A generates a
random value ai ∈ Zp for each time period i, where
i ≥ 1. ai will be invalid after the period i. A signs B’s
identity IDB , and sends the signature σ, IDB , ai to
PKG via a secure channel.
Delegator Sign:
• Choose z ∈ Zp, and compute U = gz .
• Compute V = HI (IDB , U).
• Compute W = gαrA+V .
• The signature on IDB is σ = (U,W ).
2) PKG verifies the signature.
PKG Verify:
• Compute V = HI (IDB , U).
• Accept the signature iff e(h1,W ) =
e(h1rA , gα)e(h1, g)V .
3) If verification passes, PKG generates a unique
randomly-selected secret parameter y ∈ Zp,
and computes re-encryption key rkA→B =
(α−idBα−idA + aiy) mod p,A1 =
(
h1
rAg−r
′
A
)y
, B1 =(
h1
rBg−r
′
B
)aiy/(α−idB)
, B2 = h1aiy and sends
rkA→B , A1, B1, B2 to A.
Partial-Decryption-Key Generation:
1) Delegatee B sends h′B to A via a secure and authenti-
cated channel.
2) A checks whether e(h1, B1) = e(B2, h′B) to ensure
B1 is a valid value which will help delegatee for
decryption. If correct, output 1, otherwise, output 0.
3) A checks whether
h′A
(idA−idB)·A1ai ·
(
h1
rAg−r
′
A
)
=
(
h1
rAg−r
′
A
)rkA→B
to ensure that rkA→B is a re-encryption key generated
properly for delegation from her to B.
4) A sends the re-encryption key rkA→B to Proxy via an
authenticated channel.
5) A computes h′B1/rA and B11/rA , and sends them to B
as partial decryption key.
Table I
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Property BBS [2] ID [6] Ateniese [1] Wang [11] Ours
Uni-directional No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-interactive No Yes Yes No No
Proxy invisibility Yes No Yes# Yes Yes#
Original-access Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Key optimal Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Collusion-safe No No Yes Yes Yes
Temporary Yes! Yes! Yes! No Yes!
Non-transitive No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-transferable No No No No* Yes
Non-Key-escrow −− No −− No Yes
Non-PKG-despotism −− No −− No Yes
(∗) PKG alone can transfer
(#) Ateniese [1] can only achieve proxy invisible to delegatee, our scheme
can only achieve proxy invisible to delegator.
(!) possible to achieve with additional assumption and overhead.
Re-Encryption:
Proxy computes β = H(C1, C2, C3, C4) and tests
whether e(C5, g) = Cβ2 C4. If it is not equal, output ⊥. Else
computes C1′ = C1rkA→B = grAs(α−idA)(
α−idB
α−idA +aiy), and
sends (C1′, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) to B.
Decryption (delegatee):
B computes β = H(C1, C2, C3, C4) and tests whether
e(C5, g) = C
β
2 C4. If it is not equal, output ⊥. Else B
computes
C3
e(C1
′,h′B
(1/rA)(1/rB))C2
rB,1
e(C1,B1
(1/rA)(1/rB))
= C3
e(g
rAs(α−idA)(
α−idB
α−idA
+aiy)
,(h1g
−rB,1 )
1
(α−idB)rA )(e(g,g)s)rB,1
e(grAs(α−idA),(h1g
−rB,1 )
aiy
(α−idB)rA )
= m
If e(g, g)H′(m) = C4 holds, return m; otherwise return ⊥.
III. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING PROXY
RE-ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
The main advantage of our scheme is: It achieved Non-
transferable property, Non-Key-escrow property and Non-
PKG-despotism property, in which Non-Key-escrow prop-
erty and Non-PKG-despotism property are defined by us
especially for estimating security of a PKG involved PRE
schemes. To compare some existing proxy re-encryption
schemes with our proposed scheme as fully as possible, we
also analyze below some important properties defined in [1].
The comparison results are presented in Table 1. For more
analysis details, please refer to the full version of our paper
[5].
Our scheme adds more rounds of interaction for the
following reasons:
• Private Key Correctness Check is added for checking
the partial private key generated by PKG, since PKG
is not fully trusted in our assumption.
• In Re-encryption Key Generation, step 1 and 2 are
added for PKG to verify delegator and get delegatee’s
identity, since PKG is responsible for generating re-
encryption key. Without verification, attacker may im-
personate delegator to trick PKG into generating re-
encryption key.
• Partial-Decryption-Key Generation is added to prevent
PKG, proxy and delegatee re-delegating decryption
right from colluding. With this step, even if PKG, proxy
and delegatee’s collude, they are unable to generate
re-encryption key for re-delegating decryption right
without the original delegator’s help.
Note that these extra interaction will not affect the efficiency
of our scheme, since they are performed only once, at
initialization time.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we attempt to solve the open problem
pointed out in NDSS 2005, in proposing a non-transferable
proxy re-encryption scheme in which the proxy and a
delegatee cannot collude to transfer decryption rights. We
also introduced two important properties, namely Non-Key-
escrow and Non-PKG-despotism, into the proposed PRE
scheme. The principle behind our solution is that instead of
‘prohibiting’ a party to propagate information, we punish the
party who illegitimately propagates information by exposing
the important secrets of the party. This method is feasible
due to the fact that nobody would run the risk of exposing its
own secrets to do illegal decryption right transfer. Thus, our
‘punish’ method is more practicable and effective than the
‘tracing’ method in [7] and the ‘unforgeability’ method in
[4], because it can strongly prevent illegal decryption right
transfer from happening, but not just tracing the malicious
proxy after the illegal decryption right transfer.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first paper
which practically solves the transferable problem.
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